Security measures for nuclear fuel cycle
transport
Security involves the various measures to guard against the
consequences of intentional malicious acts. The main concern in the
past was theft and diversion of nuclear material but the tragic
events of 11 September 2001 in the USA, and other recent incidents,
have heightened sensitivities to security in face of terrorist
action. Whereas safety of radioactive material transport depends on
the integrity of the package and is clearly the responsibility of
the consignor, security is mainly the responsibility of the State,
which has to set up the necessary regulatory framework.
The materials used in the nuclear fuel cycle industry have
traditionally been subject to extensive national protection
measures. This responsibility extends to the right of a State to
oversee the security measures that are taken during the transport
of material originating from or obligated to their country. A range
of protection measures has been employed during transport, as
deemed appropriate, ranging from the design of the package and the
vehicles used as well as security forces, access control, employee
screening, satellite tracking of shipments and co-ordination with
local and national security authorities.
The objectives of the requirements of physical protection of
such materials during transport is assisted by minimising both the
total time the material remains in transport and the number and
duration of transfers of the material, avoiding the use of regular
movement schedules and limiting the advance knowledge of transport
information including date of departure, route and destination to
designated officials having a need to know that information.
UN and IAEA Initiatives
In 2008, the IAEA published enhanced measures for security
in the transport of radioactive materials, including nuclear fuel
cycle materials. This is intended to complement the security
requirements in the UN "Model Regulations'' which contain a basic
security level for the transport of all dangerous goods as well as
additional requirements for an enhanced security level for goods
defined as 'high consequence dangerous goods', which have the
potential to give rise to serious consequences in the event of a
terrorist incident. These include such materials as explosives,
flammable bulk liquids and gases, potentially dangerous chemicals
etc. as well as Class 7 radioactive materials in Type B or Type C
packages. For all these so-called high consequence dangerous goods,
not just nuclear fuel cycle materials, enhanced security
requirements apply.
Security requirements for sea transport
The International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code (IMDG Code)
became mandatory in January 2001 and the current edition includes a
chapter on security which came into force in January 2006 (on a
voluntary basis in January 2005).
The Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention was revisited after
the events of 9/11 in the USA to enhance ship and port facility
security. The London Conference on Security at Sea held in 2002
resulted in the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code
(ISPS Code) and SOLAS amendments to establish appropriate security
plans for ship and port facilities. This came into in force July
2004.
Special nuclear materials
In addition to the UN Model Regulations there is an
international instrument developed by the IAEA, The Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, INFCIRC 225.
In this context nuclear materials are those which carry a potential
risk of being used in a nuclear explosive device. This requires
States to take appropriate measures to ensure security and includes
the physical protection requirements for nuclear material in use,
storage and during transport. Three categories of security are
defined depending on the nature of the material.
The nuclear materials covered by INFCIRC 225 are principally
plutonium and highly enriched U235 and U233, for which the highest
security category applies.
INFCIRC 225 now extends to national as well as international
transport.
In 2011, the IAEA published a revised edition of the Nuclear
Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear
Materials and Nuclear Facilities which brings together all
transport related security requirements in one chapter
"Requirements for Measures Against Unauthorised Removal and
Sabotage of Nuclear Material during Transport".